gory of individuals (e.g., Blacks) and some positive or negative evaluative dimension. In other words, these measures assess one's implicit attitude toward that category of people (e.g., Fazio, 1986) .
How are these biases so prevalent that they can be detected even in individuals who consciously disavow prejudiced beliefs? Devine (1989) argued that from an early age, almost all people are exposed to stereotypic information that is associated with particular groups, regardless of (and perhaps prior to forming) their personal beliefs. Through repeated exposure to this information, they learn stereotypes about various groups. Given that many stereotypes are negative in valence, it stands to reason that implicit associations with stereotyped groups are often negative. Indeed, these processes can occur outside of conscious awareness, as underscored by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) in their seminal article on implicit social cognition. They defined implicit attitudes as "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects" (p. 8). Thus, whether or not an individual can remember exposure to such information, it can nevertheless be stored in memory and potentially influence later responses.
Certainly, exposure to information about or experience with social groups contributes to intergroup bias, especially when the groups are well-known to the individual. But can other factors contribute to the prevalence of such bias? It is interesting that even a half-century ago, Allport (1954) cited a definition of prejudice that explicitly rejected direct experience as a precursor: "[Prejudice is] a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual experience" (p. 7). Can intergroup bias exist in the absence of experience? Minimal group research suggests that it can.
Minimal Group Research: Findings and Associated Theoretical Accounts
Unlike situations involving naturally occurring social groups with long histories of conflict, the minimal group paradigm (e.g., 789 Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971 ) is based on the random assignment of participants to in-groups and out-groups. There is no history with in-group and out-group members and, thus, no experiential reason for intergroup bias. Despite such basic conditions, the minimal group paradigm has produced, for example, more favorable evaluations (e.g., Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969) and greater allocation of rewards (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971) for fellow in-group members than for out-group members.
A number of theorists have offered explanations for why people are likely to favor their in-groups over out-groups, even in circumstances in which they lack experience with members of either group. For example, social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and, later, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) suggested that individuals derive their self-esteem from the groups to which they belong. Thus, people are motivated to see their in-groups in a favorable light, and they can elevate their self-esteem by raising the status of their in-group relative to the out-group. More recently, Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) argued that positive feelings about the self generalize to rather than derive from the in-group. They found evidence that judgments about the ingroup are made as a result of a self-anchoring process. In other words, the in-group is seen as a less extreme version of the self, with which one always has experience. This view is usually positive in valence because people tend to have positive selfevaluations (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988) . Thus, their evaluation of the in-group should also be positive because it is generalized from the self. Cadinu and Rothbart further argued that people then view the out-group in a negative light through the process of differentiation, or contrasting the in-group with the out-group. Similarly, there is now a good deal of evidence to show that mental representations of the self and the in-group overlap; that is, people view the in-group as part of the self (e.g., Smith & Henry, 1996) . Thus, even when people have no experience or are unfamiliar with their in-group, they are still likely to display bias because they do have experience with the self.
In sum, we know from minimal group research that people readily make evaluative distinctions between in-groups and outgroups. From an evolutionary perspective, it is plausible that individuals may be in a state of "mental readiness" to favor their in-groups and, through differentiation, derogate out-groups. Indeed, Krebs and Denton (1997) argued that the mechanisms of the human mind evolved in a way that favors social-cognitive biases because the biases promote survival through reciprocity processes; positively evaluating others in our in-group reassures us that our fellow in-group members will see to our needs. Similarly, Tobena, Marks, and Dar (1999) suggested that intergroup bias is due to the biased functioning of brain mechanisms that ordinarily facilitate social interactions. They argued that "stereotyping and prejudice may depend on 'prepared' properties of human neural machinery" (p. 1048). Thus, perhaps the mind automatically creates and uses positive implicit in-group associations that may lead to intergroup bias, even with unknown groups. This seems likely, given recent findings that link the in-group to the self (e.g., Smith & Henry, 1996) . That is, whether one is assigned to a group by chance or by design, one should be mentally prepared to favor one's in-group just as one favors oneself.
Exploring the Possibility of Automatic Bias Under Minimal Conditions
Minimal group research itself does not demonstrate that evaluative distinctions between in-groups and out-groups occur automatically. The standard paradigm involves the allotment of points representing resources or rewards; thus, conscious choice may be involved. Better evidence for the automaticity of intergroup bias under minimal conditions may be obtained through the methodology of social cognition. Implicit measures have become widely used in studies of intergroup bias with known groups. These measures are esteemed in part because social desirability cannot influence responses and biases can be revealed even among people who are unaware of having such biases. Such measures could also be used to test whether evaluative distinctions between in-groups and out-groups occur automatically.
One study that has used implicit measures to obtain evidence of intergroup bias with rather amorphous in-groups and out-groups is that of Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) . They argued that intergroup bias occurs so naturally that it can be obtained even with vaguely defined in-groups (i.e., we) and out-groups (i.e., they). They found that participants responded faster to pleasant words (e.g., sunshine) when primed with in-group pronouns (e.g., we) than with out-group pronouns (e.g., they). It is important to note that participants did not report awareness of the effect of the pronoun primes. These findings demonstrated that intergroup bias is facilitated automatically through the implicit association of pleasant things with in-groups. However, perhaps participants mentally substituted a particular well-known out-group for they, or, through experience, participants may have come to associate they and related pronouns with negative things and we and related pronouns with positive things. Indeed, Perdue et al. argued for such a classical conditioning process. Thus, it remains to be seen whether intergroup bias occurs automatically under minimal conditions in which people have no experience with or preconceived notions about their in-group and out-group. Such findings would suggest that the human mind may indeed be in a state of readiness to foster intergroup bias.
We investigated this issue in the present research using the recently developed Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) as a tool to measure automatic evaluative distinctions. On key trials in a typical IAT, participants view a random series of names and words presented one at a time on a computer screen. The names consist of both names that are traditionally associated with one's in-group and names that are traditionally associated with an out-group. The word list consists of both pleasant (e.g., sunshine) and unpleasant (e.g., vomit) words. Participants are required to press one key on the computer if, for example, the word is an in-group name or a pleasant word and another key if the word is an out-group name or an unpleasant word. Findings from studies using the IAT (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, in press; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999) have demonstrated that people typically respond faster on trials in which in-group names are paired (i.e., share the same response key) with pleasant words and out-group names are paired with unpleasant words (i.e., congruent trials) than on those in which in-group names are paired with unpleasant words and out-group names are paired with pleasant words (i.e., incongruent trials).
The magnitude of the effects obtained with the IAT is striking. For example, Greenwald et al. (1998) found evidence of the bias with both Korean American and Japanese American participants in an IAT in which each group served as the out-group for the other (Experiment 2, mean d = 2.04) 1 and with White participants in an IAT involving traditionally White and traditionally Black names (Experiment 3, d = 1.30 for male names, and d = 1.03 for female names). In addition, Rudman et al. (1999) obtained large pro-ingroup/anti-out-group IAT effects with Jewish versus Christian, young versus old, and American versus Soviet groups. Across three experiments, the average effect size was d = 1.32. These findings point to the automatic association of positivity with one's known in-group and negativity with one's known out-group and to the power of the IAT as a tool for investigating such associations. Consequently, we felt that the IAT would provide a good way to explore the possibility that people have a propensity for automatic intergroup bias, perhaps the result of hardwired mental configurations that have evolved for adaptive functioning (cf. Krebs & Denton, 1997; Tobena et al., 1999) .
Overview of the Present Research
We conducted three experiments to determine the extent to which intergroup bias occurs automatically under minimal conditions. With each experiment, we gradually reduced the conditions to more and more basic levels. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we examined the implicit associations that participants had for a known in-group and an unknown out-group. In Experiment 2 we replicated Experiment 1 and eliminated a potential confound (i.e., exemplar, or name, familiarity). Finally, in Experiment 3 we randomly assigned participants to groups using a standard minimal group procedure and then measured the extent to which they automatically favored their in-group. In this way, we were able to test the limits of automatic intergroup bias and to determine to what extent people automatically distinguish in-groups and outgroups on evaluative dimensions. Evidence of automatic bias under such minimal conditions would lend credence to the possibility that we are in a state of mental preparedness to favor in-groups over out-groups. Such mental readiness might then lay the groundwork for learning and/or classical conditioning processes, as described by Devine (1989) and others. Perhaps these processes could jointly help account for the widespread nature of intergroup bias.
Experiment 1
As a first step toward understanding whether evaluative differentiation occurs automatically, we administered an IAT with a known in-group (i.e., American) and an unknown out-group (i.e., Surinam) 2 for participants. Actual American names were used as exemplars for the American category, and fictitious names were created for the Surinam category. For comparison purposes, participants also completed an IAT involving White as the in-group and Black as the out-group. Previous experiments (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998, Experiment 3; Monteith et al., in press) using this IAT have yielded very large effects of intergroup bias.
We wish to address two questions. First, will an IAT effect in favor of the in-group be obtained when the out-group is unknown? Minimal group research suggests that this should occur, as does research conducted concurrently with the present studies (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001 ). Second, if we obtain an IAT effect when using an unknown out-group, will it be as strong as it is when a history of experience with both groups has contributed to the associations?
Method Participants
Eighteen White American college students (11 female and 7 male) enrolled in an introductory psychology class volunteered to participate in exchange for research credit toward their course grade.
Design
We used a 2 (trial type: congruent vs. incongruent) X 2 (IAT type: White/Black vs. American/Surinam) repeated measures design. In addition, we counterbalanced the order of the IATs and crossed this factor with whether congruent or incongruent trials were completed first to control for possible order effects. There were no significant effects associated with order or participant sex. Thus, we do not discuss these variables further.
Apparatus
The IAT was administered on a Dell Windows 95 personal computer (Pentium 166 processor). It was programmed and executed using IAT for 
Materials
All pleasant and unpleasant words and Black and White names were adopted from Greenwald et al.'s (1998) stimulus lists. The American names were actual male and female traditionally White names not appearing in the list of White names used in the White/Black IAT. We generated the Surinam names in an attempt to create names that were not associated with any particular country or ethnicity. To ensure that this was the case, we asked 22 undergraduates enrolled in a social psychology course to participate in a pilot study in exchange for extra credit toward their grade. They were given a list of 56 names that we created, and they were asked to indicate whether they associated the names with a particular country or ethnicity. Specifically, participants were asked to write the name of a country or an ethnicity beside a name if they associated that name with a particular country or ethnicity or to indicate that they were completely unfamiliar with a name by writing an N beside that name. If 13 or more people wrote an N beside a name and if the remaining participants did not associate that name with a particular country or ethnicity, we included it in the Surinam name list. Eighteen names were retained for use in the American/Surinam IAT.
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Procedure
Participants completed the experiment individually. A White American experimenter greeted each participant, obtained informed consent, and explained that she would start a computer program that would present the task for the experiment. She emphasized that participants should respond quickly but also accurately, and she instructed participants to inform her when they had completed the IAT. The experimenter then started the program, closed the door to the room, and waited in an adjoining room. At this point, approximately half of the participants completed the White/ Black IAT first, and the others completed the American/Surinam IAT first.
White/Black IAT. The computer program began with general instructions that explained that participants would be assigning words to categories. Then the program presented the categorization task, which contained seven trial blocks. For each block, categories appeared on the right and left sides of the screen, and stimulus words appeared in the middle of the screen, one at a time in a random order. The participants' task was to categorize the stimulus words by assigning them to the category on the right or the left side of the screen by pressing the 5 key on the number pad or the A key, respectively. Before each trial began, instructions explained which stimuli were to be categorized on the right versus the left for that block. For example, in the first block of one version, participants were to assign Black names to the right and White names to the left. Whenever an incorrect categorization was made, a red X appeared below the stimulus name, and the name remained until participants assigned it to the correct category. Whenever a correct categorization was made, a green circle appeared below the stimulus name, and then the next stimulus name appeared.
In this version of the LAT, participants were asked to categorize names as Black or White and words as pleasant or unpleasant. Specifically, in the first block, participants assigned names to the categories Black and White. In the second block, participants assigned words to the categories pleasant and unpleasant. In the third block, these two categorization tasks were combined; participants were presented with both names and words and had to assign them to one of the four appropriate categories (i.e., Black name, White name, pleasant word, or unpleasant word). In the fifth block, the placement of the categories was switched so that the category assigned to the left side in the first block was switched to the right side and vice versa. The sixth and seventh blocks again required participants to assign words and names to one of the four appropriate categories, retaining the switch that was made in the fifth block. For example, in the version in which incongruent trials occurred before congruent trials, the blocks were presented in the following order: Block 1, Black name/White name; Block 2, pleasant word/unpleasant word; Block 3, pleasant word or Black name/ unpleasant word or White name; Block 4, pleasant word or Black name/ unpleasant word or White name; Block 5, White name/Black name; Block 6, pleasant word or White name/unpleasant word or Black name; and Block 7, pleasant word or White name/unpleasant word or Black name. Of the seven blocks, five were for practice (Blocks 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6) and two were of central interest (Blocks 4 and 7). Each of the key blocks included 40 trials, and the intertrial interval was 150 ms.
American/Surinam IAT. The American/Surinam IAT was identical to the White/Black IAT, except that the categories Black and White were replaced with the categories American and Surinam. Thus, congruent trials were those in which American names and pleasant words shared a response key and Surinam names and unpleasant words shared a response key. Incongruent trials were those in which the reverse pairings occurred (e.g., American names and unpleasant words shared a response key). The American names were different than those used in the White/Black IAT, whereas the evaluative words were the same as those used in the White/Black IAT.
On completion of the IATs, the experimenter probed the participants to ensure that they were unfamiliar with Surinam and the names of its supposed inhabitants and that they had no preconceptions about people from Surinam. No participant reported familiarity or preconceived notions. The experimenter then debriefed, thanked, and gave credit slips to the participants.
Results and Discussion
Data Reduction
Consistent with Greenwald et al. (1998) , we dropped the first two trials in each block because response latencies tend to be long as participants familiarize themselves with the task. Also in keeping with Greenwald et al., all response latencies that were below 300 ms and above 3,000 ms were recoded as 300 ms and 3,000 ms, respectively. Reaction times less than 300 ms were considered indicative of participants mistakenly pressing the key before reading the presented word, and those greater than 3,000 ms were considered evidence of participants not paying attention. The latencies were log-transformed, and logged latencies were used in all subsequent analyses. For ease of interpretation, results are presented in milliseconds. This data reduction procedure was used for all of the experiments reported herein.
IAT Results
A 2 (trial type: congruent vs. incongruent) X 2 (IAT type: White/Black vs. American/Surinam) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the transformed latencies. A trial type effect was obtained, F(l, 17) = 77.05, p < .001, d = 2.13, indicating that participants were significantly faster on congruent (M = 792.05) than incongruent trials (M = 1,035.83). It is important to note that this was the case for both types of IATs. Thus, as in previous research (Greenwald et al., 1998) , White participants paired White names with pleasant words and Black names with unpleasant words more easily than they made the reverse pairings. More germane to the purpose of the present research, participants found it easier to associate their in-group (i.e., American names) with pleasant words and the out-group (i.e., Surinam names) with unpleasant words than they found it to make reverse pairings, even though participants lacked experience with Surinam.
A main effect of IAT type also emerged, F(l, 17) = 4.86, p = .04, d = 0.53, indicating that participants were significantly faster on the American/Surinam IAT (M = 888.79) than on the White/ Black IAT (M = 939.08). Perhaps participants were not as cognitively taxed with the task of distinguishing American and Surinam names as they were with the task of distinguishing Black and White names, to which they likely had more exposure.
Most important for our purposes, the interaction was not significant, F < 1.00, indicating that IAT effects were equivalent for White/Black and American/Surinam IATs. Consistent with minimal group research, participants displayed intergroup bias even when they were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the out-group. Moreover, this bias was driven by implicit processes and was as large as biases in conditions in which participants presumably had stored associations for both the in-group and the out-group. This suggests that an automatic differentiation between in-group and out-group may have been taking place. That is, participants contrasted Surinam with their positively viewed American in-group. More important, this differentiation occurred within milliseconds, outside participants' conscious control.
Experiment 2
In this experiment we further reduced the conditions so that participants were equally unfamiliar with the exemplars (i.e., names) of both groups, American and Marisat. Again, for comparison purposes, all participants completed a White/Black IAT. We retained the familiar category label American so that participants would recognize one group as their in-group. However, we constructed fictitious American and Marisat names to be unfamiliar to participants and to be distinguishable only with the use of a heuristic that we supplied. Some participants were told that all American names contained the letter Q (e.g., Qutar) and all Marisat names contained the letter X (e.g., Nardoxa), whereas the heuristic was switched for the remaining participants (i.e., participants were told that American names contained the letter X and Marisat names contained the letter Q).
This procedure provided us with a test of the extent to which the mind readily and automatically forms associations that favor stimuli that have been only minimally associated with the in-group. That is, participants were only initially told that certain exemplars were associated with Americans and others with Marisat. Subsequently, they were expected to rely on the supplied heuristic to complete the categorization task rather than consciously thinking about the categories American and Marisat. To assess whether participants in fact used the supplied heuristic, we asked them, after they had completed both IATs, to indicate the strategy they used to categorize each type of name.
The procedure also helped us to address an alternative explanation for IAT effects; namely, differential exemplar familiarity (see Greenwald et al., 1998) . For example, the results of Experiment 1 may have been obtained because participants were more familiar with American than with Surinam names. Indeed, such an explanation is consistent with previous research on the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) , which indicates that people more positively evaluate things that are more familiar to them. Moreover, consistent with the results of Experiment 1, Brendl et al. (2001) similarly used fictitious exemplars in an IAT and demonstrated implicit negativity toward unfamiliar, compared with familiar, stimuli. Of course, if the IAT is to be considered a valid measure of implicit attitudes or associations, then this alternative familiarity interpretation should be explored and ruled out.
A few recent studies have shed light on the familiarity issue. For example, Rudman et al. (1999) found that American participants displayed equivalent effects on IATs using names of American and Soviet leaders, regardless of the familiarity of these names as names of leaders. However, although names like Fillmore, Polk, Pierce, and Tyler may be difficult to recognize as those of American presidents, they are still distinctly recognizable as American names and are likely more familiar to American participants than are the familiar Soviet leaders' names that were used (e.g., Stalin, Lenin, Brezhnev, and Krushchev). Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, and Banaji (2000) obtained similar findings using equally unfamiliar photographs of nonfamous Whites and Blacks. Specifically, participants categorized unfamiliar faces as Black versus White and words as pleasant versus unpleasant, and an IAT effect was obtained even with this procedure. Although these results speak to the generality and robustness of the IAT effect, they do not completely rule out the possibility of a familiarity effect. That is, perhaps participants were more familiar with White faces in general, given that Whites are often the majority. In the present study, the use of fictitious names as exemplars of both the in-group and the out-group should help to discount the familiarity argument, to complement the research of Rudman et al. and Dasgupta et al., and to extend the findings of Brendl et al. (2001) . If IAT effects favoring the in-group are obtained, then they cannot be due to participants' greater familiarity with in-group exemplars.
Given the minimal conditions of this experiment, we were not sure whether we would obtain an IAT effect for the American/ Marisat IAT. Because participants had only a heuristic to distinguish equally unfamiliar in-group and out-group names and were exposed only briefly to the names in connection with the heuristic, it seemed difficult to imagine that the participants would display any bias. Evidence of a bias, however, would certainly underscore the automatic nature of intergroup bias under minimal conditions.
Method Participants
Twenty-six students enrolled in upper level psychology courses completed the experiment. Data from 4 Black participants were discarded because of the difficulty in interpreting their data on the White/Black IAT (i.e., a congruent trial for a Black participant would be equivalent to an incongruent trial for a White participant). In addition, data from 1 participant whose surname began with the letter Q were discarded because she showed a preference for out-group names that contained Q in the American/Marisat IAT (see Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993) . Thus, data from 21 participants 4 (8 male, 13 female) were used in all analyses. Participants I were paid $7 for their participation.
Design
The manipulation of two variables yielded a 2 (trial type: congruent vs. incongruent) X 2 (IAT type: White/Black vs. American/Marisat) repeated measures design. We counterbalanced the order of the IATs and crossed this factor with whether congruent or incongruent trials were completed first to control for possible order effects. Also, we counterbalanced which heuristic was used (i.e., whether Marisat names or American names contained the letter Q vs. X) to ensure that results would not be due to a preference for the letter Q or X. There were no significant effects associated with order, heuristic, or participant sex. Thus, these variables are not discussed further.
Apparatus
The apparatus was identical to that used in Experiment 1, with the exception of the program version used. For this experiment, we used the updated version of the IAT, The Farnham Implicit Association Test (FIAT) for Windows 2.3 (Farnham, 1998) .
Materials
For both versions of the IAT, all pleasant and unpleasant words were adopted from Greenwald et al.'s (1998) 
Procedure
The experimenter explained to participants that they would be performing a categorization task in which names and words were assigned to categories. At this point, approximately half of the participants completed the White/Black IAT, and the others completed the American/Marisat IAT.
White/Black IAT. The program was identical to the White/Black IAT described in Experiment 1, with one exception. Before the categorization task began, the stimulus word lists appeared, and participants were given the chance to examine the words for each category (i.e., Black names, White names, pleasant words, and unpleasant words) and to delete any words that they did not associate with each category. For example, for the White names list, participants could delete the name Wendy if they did not feel that Wendy is typically the name of a White person.
American/Marisat IAT. The experimenter explained that participants would be categorizing names and words. She mentioned that it would be fairly easy to categorize the words but that it might be a little more tricky to categorize the names. She then showed participants two lists, one of purportedly uncommon American names and one of Marisat names. She proceeded to explain that for each type of name (i.e., American and Marisat), there was a simple rule that the participants could follow to make the categorization task easier. Specifically, half of the participants were told that all American names contained the letter Q and all Marisat names contained the letter X. The heuristic was switched for the remaining participants (i.e., American names contained the letter X and Marisat names contained the letter Q). Participants then had 30 s to read the word lists. The experimenter collected the word lists, then tested participants to make sure they knew which names contained which letter. Once participants mentioned the correct heuristic (and all did so readily), they were able to complete the IAT. As with the White/Black IAT, the experimenter explained that the instructions would be provided by the computer program. She emphasized that participants should respond quickly but also accurately, and she instructed participants to inform her when they had finished completing the IAT.
The American/Marisat IAT was similar to the White/Black IAT, with the following exceptions. First, participants were not given the opportunity to delete any words from the word lists. Second, we programmed four versions of the American/Marisat IAT to control for possible order effects. Whether Q or X corresponded with American names was counterbalanced and crossed with whether congruent or incongruent trials were presented first. For example, in one version, American names contained the letter X and Marisat names contained the letter Q and participants completed incongruent trials before congruent trials.
After participants informed the experimenter that they had completed either the White/Black or American/Marisat IAT, the experimenter started the program for the other IAT and then waited in an adjoining room.
Strategies. To ensure that participants used the supplied heuristic to categorize the unfamiliar Marisat and American names, the experimenter questioned participants about their categorization strategies. For comparison purposes, the experimenter also asked participants about their strategies for categorizing White and Black names. So as not to lead participants, the experimenter explained, "People often adopt a strategy that helps them make correct responses. We are interested in knowing what kinds of strategies you used to categorize the names. What kind of strategy did you use? In other words, what exactly were you thinking when you had to categorize these names?" The experimenter then showed participants an example of each type of name (i.e., Qutar, Nardoxa, Jerome, and Wendy) and recorded their responses for each of the four names. We expected that participants would report thinking "Black name" or "White name" for the White/Black IAT. However, because the heuristic was critical for distinguishing American and Marisat names for the American/Marisat IAT, we expected participants to report thinking "X name" or "Q name" rather than thinking about the categories American and Marisat.
Finally, all participants were debriefed. During debriefing, they were asked whether they knew where Marisat was and whether they had an idea of what people from Marisat would be like. No participant indicated knowing where Marisat was or had an opinion as to what people from Marisat would be like. They were then paid $7 and thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
Strategies
We first examined all open-ended responses regarding the strategies participants used to categorize each type of name. Two coders independently reviewed the open-ended responses and assigned responses to categories; they agreed on approximately 90% of the responses. On the occasion of disagreement, the coders conferred with each other and reached an agreement. For categorizing the Black and White names, approximately 67% of the participants reported that they consciously thought to themselves, "Black name or White name" and then made their categorizations according to their knowledge of which names were traditionally Black versus White names. Approximately 28% of the participants stated that they were unfamiliar with the Black names, so whenever they encountered an unfamiliar name they assumed it must be Black. Finally, approximately 5% of the participants reported that they memorized a few of the names off the list shown to them at the beginning of the computer program. Overall, these responses revealed that participants had a lot of experience with Black and White names and made their categorizations accordingly.
When asked to describe their strategies for categorizing the Marisat and American names, however, participants had no such experience on which to rely. In fact, all participants reported that they consciously thought of the letters Q and X rather than the categories Marisat and American. In other words, when deciding which response key to press to make the categorizations, participants thought to themselves, for example, "pleasant and X on the right, unpleasant and Q on the left" rather than "pleasant and American on the right, unpleasant and Marisat on the left." Thus, participants relied on the heuristic to categorize the Marisat and American names. Although this heuristic had initially been linked to American and Marisat names, participants reported that they were not consciously thinking of these categories as they completed the task.
IAT Results
We examined whether participants, even with equally unfamiliar exemplars for both in-group and out-group, nevertheless displayed a pro-in-group IAT bias. A 2 (trial type: congruent vs. incongruent) X 2 (IAT type: White/Black vs. American/Marisat) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the transformed latencies. Replicating Experiment 1, a trial type effect was obtained, F(l, 20) = 34.03, p < .001, d = 1.30, indicating that participants were significantly faster on congruent (M = 831.72) than incongruent trials (M = 986.5; see Table 1 for cell means).
There was also a significant Trial Type X IAT Type interaction, F(l, 20) = 21.22, p < .001. The nature of the interaction was such that the IAT effect was larger in the White/Black IAT, f(20) = 6.63, p < .001, d = 1.48, than in the American/Marisat IAT, r(20) = 2.22, p < .04, d = 0.50. This seems logical, given the unusual nature of the American/Marisat task. It is important to note that although it was smaller in magnitude, the IAT effect was nevertheless significant for the American/Marisat IAT.
These results demonstrate the ease with which intergroup bias emerges. What is remarkable about these findings is that participants showed implicit intergroup biases even in relation to completely unfamiliar names that were tied to either the in-group or the out-group only by a recently introduced heuristic. Thus, it appears that even when there is minimal experiential or historical input available, our minds are prepared for us to display bias effortlessly.
Of course, one limitation of the present study is that one can never be certain exactly what participants were thinking during such an unusual task. The possibility remains that participants were positively associating either X or Q with American and that this positive association drove the results. For these participants, the category American is likely an extension of the self (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) , regardless of their lack of familiarity with the exemplars. Nevertheless, this association of X or Q with American does not appear to be a deliberate or conscious process. This reasoning is consistent with that of Perdue et al. (1990) , who maintained that the association between we and pleasant words is the result of unconscious classical conditioning. Unlike the results of Perdue et al., however, participants in the present study were not repeatedly exposed to the pairing of X or Q with American. They had one brief opportunity to make that connection, and, as evidenced by the IAT results, they made it indeed.
As with the first experiment, it is plausible that the results stem from an automatic differentiation process. Participants were completely unfamiliar with the country Marisat and had no preconceptions about its citizens. In addition, unlike Experiment 1, participants could not assume that unfamiliar names were "bad"; they were equally unfamiliar with both categories of names. Presumably, even though participants were not consciously thinking of the categories American and Marisat, they still identified themselves as Americans. Thus, even unfamiliar exemplars were incorporated into their in-group, which they evaluated positively, and they saw Marisat negatively in contrast. This occurred entirely outside of their conscious awareness, suggesting that people do make Our results also speak to the familiarity concerns regarding the IAT. They suggest that although familiarity cannot be completely ruled out as an explanation for implicit intergroup bias (i.e., participants were familiar with the category label American), its role is likely minimal. Perhaps the decrease in IAT trial type effect size from Experiment 1 (d = 2.13) to Experiment 2 (d = 1.30) reflects the impact of familiarity. It is important to note, however, that the smaller effect size is nonetheless large by convention (see Footnote 1). When our results are taken with the results of Rudman et al. (1999) and Dasgupta et al. (2000) , it seems safe to say that the IAT taps into more than just a mere exposure phenomenon.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 2 provide reason to believe that people are mentally equipped to favor in-groups and derogate out-groups even when they are unfamiliar with both. However, the possibility remains that participants in both experiments, consciously or not, made some assumptions about the out-groups that we used. Perhaps participants assumed that unfamiliar countries like Surinam and Marisat are third-world countries whose inhabitants are inferior to Americans. Therefore, even though participants lacked direct experience with members of these out-groups, they still may have had some preconceptions about them.
More important, we changed the design of Experiment 3 to allow us to more directly test the idea of automatic differentiation. In other words, just how minimal can the conditions be for intergroup bias to emerge at a level beyond conscious control? We attempted to replicate the findings of our first two experiments using a true minimal group procedure. That is, we assigned participants randomly to one of two rather meaningless groups and then tested whether they would show evidence of implicit intergroup bias. Using this procedure, we could be sure that participants had no preconceived notions about the out-group. Instead, any evidence of intergroup bias would presumably be due to the individuals' linking the in-group to the self and subsequently differentiating and contrasting the out-group with the self (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996) . Moreover, because we used an implicit measure, findings of intergroup bias would suggest that this process occurs automatically. Thirty-nine participants completed the experiment individually in return for research credit applied toward their introductory psychology class. Data from 1 participant whose name contained the letter X were excluded from analyses (see Hoorens & Nuttin, 1993) . Also, data from 1 participant who did not consent for us to use his data (see Experiment 3 Procedure) were excluded, as were data from 2 participants who did not believe the manipulation (see Results and Discussion). Thus, data from 35 participants (26 female and 9 male) were used in all analyses.
Method Participants
Design
The complete design of this study was a 2 (assigned in-group: Quan vs. Xanthie) X 2 (IAT program: Q vs. X) X 2 (trial type: congruent vs. incongruent) mixed factorial, with repeated measures on the last factor. There were no significant effects associated with participant sex; thus, this variable is not discussed further.
Apparatus and Materials
The computer and program version of FIAT used were identical to those used in Experiment 2. All words and names were also identical to those used in Experiment 2. The minimal group manipulation and manipulation check were presented on Medialab Research Software 3.0 (Jarvis, 1998) .
Procedure
We used a commonly employed minimal group procedure, group assignment based on supposed artistic preference (see, e.g., Simon & Hamilton, 1994) . After obtaining informed consent, a female experimenter explained (as part of the cover story) that we were interested in examining people's artistic preferences. Participants viewed a series of 20 paintings presented individually in a fixed, random order on the computer and rated each on a scale from 1 (disliked very much) to 6 (liked very much). The paintings were obtained from the Websites of two relatively obscure artists (10 paintings by each artist) and were digitized for presentation on the computer. The artists' names were cropped from each painting so that the true artists remained anonymous. Participants were told that 10 of the paintings were created by an artist named Xanthie and 10 were created by an artist named Quan, although which paintings were painted by which artist was not revealed as participants completed the task.
At this point, the experimenter started one of two computer programs; which program was started was randomly determined. The programs were identical except that at the end of one, the computer informed participants that their ratings indicated a preference for the paintings by Quan, whereas at the end of the other, the computer informed participants that their ratings indicated a preference for the paintings by Xanthie. This feedback was given regardless of participants' actual ratings and was based only on the condition to which participants had been randomly assigned. Thus, minimal groups were established through the supposed preference of one painter over the other. The experimenter told participants to let her know when they had completed the program and waited outside the room while they completed the task.
When participants indicated that they had completed the task, the experimenter entered the room again. She read the computer screen and repeated what the computer indicated; that is, that participants apparently preferred either the artist Quan or the artist Xanthie. The experimenter further explained that previous research has demonstrated that people who prefer that particular artist process perceptual information in a bottom-up fashion, examining details to form an overall impression. This statement served to create an in-group for participants. She then went on to explain that other people, such as those who preferred the other artist, tend to process perceptual information in a top-down way, considering details after forming an overall impression. This information was, of course, evaluatively meaningless but served to highlight the distinction between the two groups.
The experimenter then informed participants that they would perform a categorization task in which they would categorize names of people according to which artist they preferred. Participants were told that they would be unfamiliar with all of the names that they would be categorizing but that they could assume that people who preferred the artist Quan would have a Q in their names, whereas those who preferred the artist Xanthie would have an X in their names. Thus, Q names were to be categorized as people who preferred Quan, and X names as people who preferred Xanthie.
The experimenter then started one of two IAT programs; which program was started was determined randomly. She explained that all instructions would be provided by the computer and emphasized that participants should respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. The IAT programs were similar to those used in the American/Marisat IAT in Experiment 2 in terms of number of blocks and trials. Half of the participants were assigned to complete a program in which Quan was paired with pleasant first (i.e., Q IAT), whereas the others completed a program in which Xanthie was paired with pleasant first (i.e., X IAT). The experimenter informed participants that she would wait outside as they completed the task and that they should inform her once they had completed the task.
After completing the IAT, participants completed three manipulation check items that were presented by the computer. The first was, "I believe that I preferred the paintings by," and participants provided a rating between 1 (Quan) and 7 (Xanthie), with a rating of 4 indicating neither. The second question read, "I noticed distinct differences in the styles of the paintings I viewed," and participants made a rating between 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree). The final question read, "My perceptual style can be best characterized as," with the endpoints ranging from 1 (top-down) to 7 (bottom-up) .
Once participants informed the experimenter that they had finished, the experimenter probed them for suspicion. The experimenter then debriefed them and asked for permission to use their data (to fulfill Institutional Review Board requirements). Finally, she thanked them and gave them a credit slip.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
We first examined the manipulation check items. Two female participants, one in the Quan and one in the Xanthie condition, indicated that they preferred neither artist on the first manipulation check question. Therefore, their data were excluded from analyses. All other data were in line with participants' assigned condition. Specifically, participants assigned to the Quan in-group reported that they preferred Quan (M = 1.22, SD = 0.43), and their mean response was significantly below the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 4), /(17) = 27.55, p < .001. Similarly, participants assigned to the Xanthie condition reported that they preferred Xanthie (M = 6.47, SD = 0.72), and their mean response was significantly above the scale midpoint, ?(16) = 14.2, p < .001. In examining the second and third manipulation check items, we found that there was some variability in the ratings; however, the mean of each item was significantly above the midpoint. For Item 2, M = 5.46, SD = 1.60, /(34) = 5.40, p < .001. For Item 3, M = 5.97, SD = 1.58, r(34) = 7.38, p < .001. Overall, participants appeared to believe the manipulation.
IAT Results
To determine whether participants who were randomly assigned to minimal groups would show evidence of in-group favoritism/ out-group derogation on an automatic task, we conducted a 2 (assigned in-group: Quan or Xanthie) X 2 (IAT program: Q vs. X) X 2 (trial type: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. The only significant finding that emerged was a main effect of trial type. As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants took longer to respond on incongruent (M = 906.37 ms) than congruent (M = 833.77 ms) trials, F(l, 27) = 7.62, p = .01, d = 0.53. Regardless of which artist participants were randomly assigned to prefer, they displayed an in-group favoritism bias. That is, whenever their in-group was paired with pleasant words and their out-group was paired with unpleasant words, participants had an easier time completing the task than when the reverse pairings occurred. This occurred even though the task was automatic and even though participants had no history of experience with the in-group or the out-group. These results are consistent with the idea that our minds are in a state of readiness to evaluate our in-groups positively and our out-groups negatively.
General Discussion
The present findings point to the automatic nature of evaluative differentiation between in-groups and out-groups, suggesting that people are hardwired for intergroup bias. That is, intergroup bias emerges at the implicit level, without people's intent or conscious awareness-even under basic and rather unlikely conditions. These findings are consistent with the ideas of Lippman (1922) and Allport (1954) , who suggested that categorization is at the root of intergroup bias and that this process is natural and universal. In this sense, the present research is an affirmation of previously described ideas.
A novel contribution of the present research is the idea that this automatic bias occurs even without prior direct experience with or exposure to the in-group or out-group. Although countless studies in recent years have convincingly demonstrated that intergroup bias occurs automatically, they have done so using well-known social groups with which participants likely had great experience. Without question, exposure to information about in-groups and out-groups serves to develop and strengthen implicit associations that may contribute to intergroup bias (e.g., Devine, 1989) . The present findings suggest that, perhaps even prior to such exposure, the human mind is in a state of preparedness to receive and accept such information.
In this sense, the present findings extend the previous work of Perdue et al. (1990) , who obtained evidence of automatic intergroup bias with such vaguely defined social groups as we and they. Although Perdue et al.'s work certainly underscored the pervasiveness of intergroup bias even with commonly used pronouns that, on the surface, seem neutral, people of course do have experience with many different wes and theys. The present research demonstrates that in the absence of direct experience with the in-group and out-group, automatic intergroup bias nevertheless emerges.
The present findings are also consistent with Otten and Moskowitz's (2000) recent findings of implicit in-group bias on a spontaneous trait inference task using the minimal group paradigm. Specifically, they found that responses to behaviors that implied positive traits were facilitated more when those behaviors were associated with in-group than with out-group members. Their results, together with the present findings, provide converging evidence that people evaluatively distinguish between in-groups and out-groups automatically, even when there is no experiential reason to do so.
Another implication of the present findings is that familiarity alone cannot be responsible for intergroup biases. Participants displayed significant IAT effects even when they were equally unfamiliar with the in-group and the out-group. This finding adds to the growing body of literature (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2000; Rudman et al., 1999) demonstrating that IAT effects are more than by-products of differential familiarity. This point may seem rather inconsequential, but considering the growing popularity of the IAT as a research tool (see IAT Corp., 2000) , it is important for researchers to eliminate alternative explanations of the bias it presumably reflects. Moreover, the present findings, together with those of other IAT researchers, help to establish that intergroup bias in general cannot be reduced to mere exposure. Rather, perhaps intergroup bias stems in part from the way the human mind is organized and how it structures information (cf. Tobena et al., 1999) .
Perhaps this structuring of information revolves around the self. Previous research on the overlap between the self and the in-group (e.g., Smith & Henry, 1996) has suggested that this self-in-group connection is the force that drives findings of in-group favoritism. Consistent with this research, we believe that the self is inevitably a factor in this bias, particularly in minimal group settings. Indeed, in this regard, we perceive the present research as a complement to the research of Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) , who obtained evidence for evaluative differentiation using the minimal group paradigm. The present research extends their results by showing that this process occurs automatically. Most likely, participants in Experiment 3 in some way associated members of their newly assigned in-group (e.g., other people who liked Quan's paintings) with themselves. Consequently, it was easier for them to associate those similar (but fictitious) people with pleasant concepts. Although our data do not speak to the cognitive mechanisms that mediate this process, they do demonstrate the ease with which this self-in-group connection surfaces. Unfortunately, the potential real-world result is that people who differ from us even in inconsequential ways may bear the brunt of intergroup bias of which we are not even aware.
It is important to note that the in-group/out-group IATs used in the present experiments do not allow for the disentanglement of in-group favoritism from out-group derogation. That is, key trials on the IAT are determined jointly by the ease with which one associates, for example, pleasant words with one's in-group and unpleasant words with an out-group. Indeed, with the in-group/ out-group IATs we used, it is impossible to empirically separate positive in-group from negative out-group associations. In other words, the IAT data do not permit such analyses. However, previous findings suggest that in-group favoritism may be driving many of the effects. First, Perdue et al. (1990, Experiment 3) convincingly demonstrated that, compared with control primes, in-group pronouns facilitated responses to positive person descriptors, whereas out-group pronouns did not facilitate responses to negative descriptors. Second, Brewer (1979) , in a review of the minimal group literature, concluded that intergroup bias in minimal group settings is largely the product of in-group favoritism, not out-group derogation.
What, then, are the implications for the out-group if in-group favoritism is largely responsible for intergroup biases, at least in minimal group situations? Although they are not examined in the present research, behavioral manifestations of such implicit biases undoubtedly have negative implications for out-group members, regardless of whether the biases are rooted in in-group favoritism or out-group derogation. That is, favoring an in-group member in the workplace, for example, necessarily results in an undesirable outcome for out-group members. It is important in future research to investigate the behavioral implications of IAT biases.
Finally, one might wonder exactly what participants were thinking as they underwent the unusual tasks used in Experiments 2 and 3. Indeed, a concern for us when designing these studies was that the minimal group manipulation would be ineffective for eliciting automatic biases. However, once the heuristic was supplied, participants readily used it. Exactly how one applies a consciously processed heuristic to an implicit measure is beyond the scope of these data. Nevertheless, all outward appearances of the participants suggested that they had no problems doing so, and the pattern of the findings clearly shows this was the case.
If intergroup biases run as deep as the present research implies, what will it take to alleviate them? If our minds are fertile ground for the seeds of intergroup bias, is bias inevitable? The common in-group identity model (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995) suggests that recategorization, or the transformation of group members' mental representations of separate groups into one common in-group, can reduce intergroup bias. As a result of the transformation, former out-group members come to be seen as fellow in-group members, yielding a "supergroup," and subsequently receive the evaluative benefits of the in-group. Recent evidence for recategorization was obtained in a study in which intergroup interaction and common fate reduced intergroup bias on explicit (i.e., evaluation ratings) and implicit (i.e., facial affect) measures, respectively (Gaertner et al., 1999) . Moreover, group members' cognitive representations of the supergroup mediated the effect of interaction on intergroup bias. These findings suggest that intergroup cooperation indeed encourages reduction in bias not only in overt behavior but also in more subtle cognitive associations.
Motivationally based strategies provide another promising avenue for reducing bias. If motivated, people may be able to make conscious efforts to avoid engaging in biased responses that are detrimental to the out-group once they become aware of biases they have. Consistent with this reasoning, Monteith (1993) found that low-prejudice participants who believed that their responses on a questionnaire were more prejudiced than their personal standards deemed appropriate were later able to effectively inhibit prejudiced responses.
In summary, the present findings should not be taken as evidence that bias is inevitable and that bias reduction is a hopeless enterprise. Prejudice reduction techniques such as those described above hold promise that individuals who are motivated and cognitively able to avoid biased responding may be successful at doing so. However, if the human mind is in a state of preparedness for intergroup bias to occur, then individuals, though motivated and able, may have to expend great time and effort to reduce biases. The present findings suggest the importance of alerting such individuals of the potential difficulty in uprooting biases that are grounded so deeply. Indeed, those who wish to reduce their biases may have a long row to hoe.
